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BASIC SELF-KNOWLEDGE: ANSWERING PEACOCKE'S CRITICISMS OF CONSTITUTIVISM

ABSTRACT. Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a non-contingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke's arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism *per se*, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke's own account of self-knowledge.

1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION

How do we know what we believe? We do not observe our beliefs, nor do we typically infer that we have certain beliefs from premises about how we act or feel. Are our beliefs about what we believe then groundless? Do we have no reasons for believing we believe certain things and not others? If we do not have reasons, wouldn't that make our beliefs about what we believe unjustified?

If one does not have a reason for believing some contingent proposition, then one's belief in it is unjustified: speaking from the epistemic point of view, one should not have that belief. So if our beliefs about what we believe are groundless (if they lack the backing of reasons) then they are not justified; and if justification is necessary for knowledge, we cannot be said to know what our beliefs are. But if we do not observe our beliefs and do not figure out what we believe via inference, it is hard to see

how we could have reasons for believing that we have certain beliefs and not others. We find ourselves pushed toward an untenable self-directed skepticism.

The solution to this puzzle is disarmingly simple. Our first-order beliefs themselves provide the grounds for our second-order introspective beliefs. One's reason for thinking that one believes that p is the very fact that one believes that p.[1] Why haven't philosophers embraced this simple answer? Many epistemologists have assumed that we can justify our beliefs only through either observation or inference. They are ensnared in what Christopher Peacocke calls a "spurious trilemma": they assume that self-knowledge must be grounded "by observation; by inference; or by nothing."[2] Those, like Peacocke, who have rejected this trilemma, restrict non-observational, non-inferential knowledge to our knowledge of a narrow class of mental states: states, such as our sensations and occurrent thoughts, that are (in a sense to be explicated below) *phenomenally conscious*. Most have failed to see an important alternative, that we have basic self-knowledge of certain non-phenomenal states like belief.[3]

In the essay that follows I provide an explication and defense of the view that our knowledge of our beliefs is basic. I begin with a discussion of self-knowledge generally. First I raise what I take to be the most serious objection to inferential and observational accounts of introspective knowledge: they cannot do justice to the non-contingent, conceptual relation that holds between many of our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of these states. Any account that instead says that the relation between a first-order mental state and one's awareness that one is in that state is conceptual and non-contingent, is what I will call a "constitutivist" account of self-knowledge.

After describing two different varieties of constitutivism, I shift from a general discussion of self-knowledge to one focused on the particular case of belief. Must a constitutivist think that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless? Peacocke thinks so, but I show that his arguments apply only to reliabilism, not to constitutivism *per se*, and that constitutivism can

be divorced from reliabilism. The constitutivist is committed to holding that our introspective beliefs have a conditional form of infallibility and that they are therefore extremely reliable, but she needn't think that their justification *consists in* their reliability.[4]

The rest of the paper defends a non-reliabilist form of constitutivism. I describe a functionalist account of *direct accessibility* according to which our first-order beliefs can be directly accessible to us without being phenomenally conscious, and then contrast the resulting view with Peacocke's positive account. According to Peacocke, our second-order introspective beliefs are not primarily grounded in our first-order beliefs, but in judgments that are (again, in a sense yet to be explained) both *occurrent* and *conscious*. I show that this view is indefensible. The only coherent way to think of our second-order introspective beliefs as non-observationally and non-inferentially grounded is to accept that they are based on the very first-order beliefs that make them true.

I conclude with some remarks about false second-order introspective beliefs. Obviously, false introspective beliefs cannot be based on their truth-makers, because they have no truth-makers. I claim that one can only have a false second-order belief in atypical cases, so the existence of false second-order beliefs does not challenge the view that our typical second-order introspective beliefs are grounded in their truth-makers. I then explain what makes this "disjunctivist" account of introspective justification a palatable one. There is no plausible conception of *subjective discriminability* according to which cases in which one has a functionally operative belief are subjectively indiscriminable from cases in which one does not.

2. INFERENTIAL AND OBSERVATIONAL ACCOUNTS REJECTED, CONSTITUTIVISM DESCRIBED

Most of the contemporary philosophical community rejects the view, often attributed to Gilbert Ryle, that all knowledge of our mental lives must have an inferential basis.[5] Dissatisfaction with inferential accounts stems primarily from a desire to avoid

self-directed skepticism. Since we commonly do not have inferential justifications for our beliefs about what we want, believe, intend and feel, the Rylean view would have it that our typical introspective beliefs are unjustified—that we lack self-knowledge as the rule, rather than the exception—and this seems unacceptable.[6]

Ryle was driven to inferentialism in part because he assumed that the only alternative to this kind of grounding would have to involve inner perception (1949, p. 195), and he was surely right to insist that the "inner-sense" model of self-knowledge faces problems all its own. More recent critics complain that once one has the inner sense view it looks as if externalism about psychological content is incompatible with self-knowledge.[7] In any case, regardless of one's views about psychological content, there do seem to be important differences between ordinary perception of external objects – including proprioception of one's own body – and knowledge of one's own mental states. Because of these differences, it is at best misleading to speak of introspective knowledge as observational.

One important difference between perception and introspection, a difference to which Sydney Shoemaker points, is that while perceptual beliefs and observable facts are only contingently and non-conceptually related to one another, certain introspective beliefs and introspectible mental states share non-contingent, conceptual relations.[8] There are *brute* errors in observation, and *brute* ignorance of observable facts. I can, e.g., misperceive the table as brown while knowing full well what it is for something to be brown or a table. It is even more obvious that full grasp of the *brown* and *table* concepts is compatible with my lacking any beliefs about a particular table's color. (The table might be behind a wall, or in Bangladesh.) But brute errors about one's own beliefs, desires, sensations and perceptual states and brute ignorance of such states—where brute errors and failures are those not due to defective or incomplete concept possession—are much more difficult to imagine.[9]

There are several possible explanations of why self-ignorance and self-error are particularly difficult to imagine in the case of

belief. Perhaps the most plausible arises from consideration of certain varieties of Moore's Paradox. The proposition that a speaker would assert were she to utter, "P, but I do not believe that p", is unexceptional—indeed, this proposition is true whenever the speaker denoted by "I" is ignorant of the truth of p. But there is nevertheless something odd about *believing* this proposition. If a subject were to believe a Moore-Paradoxical proposition—if she were to believe the proposition she would express by uttering, "P, but I do not believe that p"— her belief in that proposition would be *self-falsifying*. To believe the proposition expressed by "P, but I do not believe that p", I must believe both of its conjuncts. My belief in the second conjunct is true if and only if I do not believe that p. But if I believe the first conjunct I therein believe that p. So by believing the first conjunct of a Moore-paradoxical proposition I make my belief in its second conjunct false. It is therefore logically impossible for the belief I would express by uttering "P, but I do not believe that p", to be true. Believing that p but that I do not believe that p is akin to believing that I have no beliefs.[10]

So a subject's belief in a Moore-paradoxical proposition would be self-falsifying, and this supports Gareth Evans' claim that grasping the rules for the use of "belief" involves (among other things) adopting a willingness to sincerely assert the proposition expressed by "I believe that p", whenever one sincerely asserts that p.[11] Suppose one sincerely asserts that p while refusing to assert that one believes that p and one is not agnostic about whether or not one believes that p. In such a case one evidences that frame of mind expressed by a sincere assertion of "P, but I do not believe that p." And it would seem to be a reasonable condition for possession of the concept of belief that one not self-apply that concept in such a way that self-falsifying judgments result. But my sincerely asserting that p either entails that I believe that p or it provides paradigmatic evidence that I have that belief. (Sincere assertion that p entails belief that p if sincere assertion *just is* the expression of belief.)[12] Similarly, my sincerely asserting that I do not believe that p either entails that I believe that I do not believe that p or it provides paradigmatic evidence of that higher-order belief. As

coming to grasp the rules for using "belief" (or a synonymous expression) is the most obvious way to acquire the concept *belief*, a subject's acquiring this concept will typically bring with it dispositions the possession of which either entails that the subject will believe that she believes p whenever she believes that p and forms a judgment about whether or not she believes that p, or entails that she will display (or be disposed to display) excellent evidence that she believes that she believes that p whenever she evidences the belief that p and forms some judgment about whether or not she has this belief. So even if our introspective beliefs are not infallible, and our first-order mental states are not "transparent", "luminous", or "self-intimating", the very concept of belief seems to ensure that these states are not independent of each other in the same way (or to the same degree) as are observable facts and perceptual beliefs.

There are, of course, a wide variety of psychological states that are not conceptually connected to our awareness of them. Character traits provide an important example. Someone needn't be irrational or conceptually confused when falsely believing herself to be courageous, she need only be overconfident. (While planning for battle she might be certain of bravery, but when the fighting begins she might still run for the hills.) Similarly, it is easy to imagine someone discovering previously unknown courage in her reaction to an unforeseen menace. But character traits differ from other psychological states in significant ways. In particular, the possibilities for brute error and ignorance seem extremely thin when our knowledge of our own beliefs is at issue. Reflection on what it take to fully grasp the concept *belief* distinguishes that concept from the concepts that we deploy when forming judgments about our own characters, and it provides strong prima facie grounds for positing a non-contingent constitutive relation between our second-order introspective beliefs and the first-order beliefs represented in their contents.

It is perhaps then not surprising that Shoemaker's most convincing arguments for constitutivism are directed at the particular relation that holds between second- and first-order beliefs. Shoemaker claims that evidence that a subject believes that p

(when conjoined with evidence of her general rationality and possession of the relevant conceptual capacities) is itself good enough evidence that she believes that she believes that p. He takes this epistemic fact to suggest a metaphysical one, namely,

> that to the extent that a subject is rational, and possessed of the relevant concepts (most importantly, the concept of belief), believing that p brings with it the cognitive dispositions that an explicit belief that one has that belief would bring, and so brings with it the at least tacit belief that one has it. (1996, p. 241)

According to Shoemaker, the dispositions that bestow upon one the belief that p typically also bestow upon one the belief that one believes that p; so, the dispositions one typically has when one believes that one believes that p will *include* among their number the dispositions that bestow upon one the belief that p. Again, this constitutivist view is incompatible with the possibility of brute introspective error and ignorance concerning one's beliefs. Therefore, if correct, it provides grounds for rejecting the perceptual model in regard to such states.

Shoemaker arrives at constitutivism by noticing the substantial overlap between the evidence one has for attributing a belief to another person and the evidence one has for attributing introspective awareness of that belief to that same person, but a constitutivist rejection of inner sense is often arrived at from an entirely distinct direction. According to Crispin Wright's careful reading, Wittgenstein thought that our self-attributions of belief, intention and meaning are not based on anything: they are, instead, "groundless".[13] But, worries Wright's Wittgenstein, if self-attributions or "avowals" of belief are groundless, why do they so often accord with third-person attributions of belief that are grounded in observation of a subject's behavior?

> How is it possible to be, for the most part, effortlessly and reliably authoritative about, say, one's intentions if the identity of an intention is fugitive when sought in occurrent consciousness … and the having of an intention is thought of as a disposition-like state?[14]

It seems that the only way an avowal of belief can be both groundless and reliable is if the avowal guarantees its own

truth.[15] But if one believes that p *only* in virtue of sincerely saying that one does, it is a mystery how a third-party could figure out that one has this belief without knowing that one has, at least at one point or another, said "I believe that p". Perhaps, then, there are two radically distinct ways of having a belief: one can believe that p simply in virtue of saying that one does, and one can believe that p in virtue of acting or being disposed to act in certain specific ways. But mustn't there be something connecting these two ways of believing? And if not, what makes it the case that a subject will typically self-ascribe a belief only when she is disposed to act in ways that will lead others to attribute it to her? Wright's Wittgenstein embraces the mystery with a quietist's charm:

> it is a fundamental anthropological fact about us that our initiation into the language in which these concepts feature results in the capacity to be moved, *who knows exactly how*, to self-ascribe states of the relevant sorts—and to do so in ways which not merely tend to accord with the appraisals which others, similarly trained, can make of what we do but which provide in general a far richer and more satisfying framework for the interpretation and anticipation of our behavior than any at which they could arrive if all such self-ascriptions were discounted. (my emphasis, 1987, p. 402)

We might call this view "anti-realist" constitutivism: it argues that our self-ascriptions of belief are mostly correct, but that there is no explanation of this fact to be had in a metaphysical account of what beliefs are. There is the fact that we use "belief" in such a way that people are generally right about what they believe and the fact that people behave as though they believe the things they say they believe, but these facts about usage and behavior are basic. They have no explanation; and, at any rate, it is "bad form" to ask for one.[16]

Not only is Shoemaker's "realist" constitutivism arrived at from another direction, its destination is also altogether different. Shoemaker employs a functionalist view of belief, together with a distinction between the core realization and the total realization of a mental property, to provide a metaphysical *explanation* of the constitutive relation at issue. According to Shoemaker,

the core realization will be a state that comes and goes as the mental state comes and goes, and which is such that, given the relatively permanent features of the organism, it plays that 'causal role' associated with that state—it is caused by the standard causes of that state, and causes its standard effects, usually in conjunction with other states. The total realization will be the core realization plus those relatively permanent features of the organism, features of the way his brain is 'wired,' which enable the core realization to play that causal role. (1996, pp. 242–243)[17]

The distinction is most easily applied to the physiological basis of sensation. The core realization of pain in normal humans will be some complicated neural event type, which we can call "cortical activation Z". While the core realization of pain will be cortical activation Z, the total realization will include Z plus those structural features of the brain and nervous system that account for the fact that Z in a particular person typically results from tissue damage and the like, and those structural features that enable Z in a particular person to (among other things) prompt that person to alter her situation so as to cut-short whatever negative stimulus she judges to be responsible for her pain.

The distinction between core and total realizations suggests two different ways in which one might explain how introspective beliefs and the first-order mental states they are about are conceptually connected without being identical. The two mental states might have different core-realizations and overlapping total realizations where one total realization is such that necessarily it is caused by the other (by way of the one core realization causing the core realization of the other); or the two states might have the same core realizations and the total realization of the first-order mental state might be a proper part of the total realization of the second-order mental state. Perhaps pains and one's beliefs about them are related in the first of these ways, while second-order beliefs and the first-order beliefs they are about are related in the second.[18] If this were so, then our typical second-order introspective beliefs would be infallible, for one could not have such a belief without having the first-order belief that would make it true. In any event, if either of the mereological relations Shoemaker describes holds

in regard to our beliefs and our beliefs about them, one's belief that one believes that p and one's belief that p will not be wholly distinct.[19]

3. PEACOCKE'S CRITICISM: NOREASONS

A constitutivist account of first-person knowledge of belief seems then to have at least two core features:

(I) The possession conditions for second-order introspective beliefs and the first-order beliefs represented in their contents are such that the relation between believing that one has a first-order belief and having that first-order belief is conceptual rather than purely contingent.

And,

(IIa) Anti-Realism: Fact (I) is either to be explained by a description of our rule for using "belief" or it deserves no explanation at all,

or,

(IIb) Realism: Fact (I) is to be explained by positing a mereological relationship between first- and second-order beliefs (or their realizers).

Interestingly, it is the *realist* view that Shoemaker holds that Peacocke chooses to criticize as a "no-reasons" account of introspective knowledge, where he describes no-reasons accounts as advancing, "the claim that there are no reasons in the offing of the sort which would be required for the second-order beliefs to be knowledge on any more reason-based approach to epistemology" (1999, p. 225). While the Wittgensteinian constitutivist describes our introspective beliefs as "groundless", and talks of our being moved, "who knows exactly how", to self-ascribe beliefs, the realist needn't picture things this way. In what, then, does Peacocke's objection consist?

When describing Shoemaker as a no-reasons theorist, Peacocke cites passages in which Shoemaker seems to endorse a reliabilist epistemology. For instance, Shoemaker writes,

> Our minds are so constituted, or our brains are so wired, that for a wide range of mental states, one's being in a certain mental state produces in one, under certain conditions, the belief that one is in that mental state. This is what our own introspective access to our mental states consists in … The beliefs thus produced will count as knowledge, not because of the quantity of evidence on which they are based (for they are based on no evidence), but because of the reliability of the mechanism by which they are produced. (1996, p. 225)

But, as Peacocke notes, this passage does not represent Shoemaker's considered view. (The quoted passage is followed by Shoemaker's admission, ''The account just sketched is very close to what I believe''.) Shoemaker's considered view is a realist form of *constitutivism*; he does not claim that second-order introspective beliefs emerge from a reliable causal mechanism, but that their near infallibility is a conceptual matter.

Still, Peacocke is right to point out that even an argument for conceptually-ensured infallibility would not settle questions concerning the justification of introspective belief for any but the most straightforward reliabilist. Why not? Because the standard objections to reliabilist accounts of perceptual and inferential knowledge apply equally well in the case of introspection. Suppose, for example, that S is an infallible psychic, but that her psychic ability has never before operated until her sixteenth birthday when she sees El Dictator (E.D.) on television and she gets the idea that he will be deposed on October 25th. S directly concludes, on the basis of this episode alone, that E.D. will be driven from office on that date. Because her premonition is the product of an infallible faculty, and because her belief is based entirely on the output of such a faculty, a straightforward reliabilist would conclude that S *knows* when E.D. will lose power.[20] Now we are, again, assuming that S's *only* reason for believing what she does is supplied by her premonitory experience: i.e. its having ''occurred'' to her that E.D.'s rule will end on the 25th of October. But, ''The thought just popped into my head'', does not express a reason for believing that thought. If one has no evidence that a future event will occur, one should not believe that it will. So it seems

that S does not have a good reason for thinking that E.D.'s rule will end on October 25th.

There are three contending reactions to this description of the scenario:

(A) One might say that because she has no adequate reason, S's belief cannot be justified, and because justification is necessary for knowledge, S does not know when E.D. will lose power: pure reliabilism must be false.[21]
(B) One might agree that S's belief is not justified, but argue that because it is obvious that S knows when E.D. will be deposed, knowledge does not require justification.[22]
(C) One might say that because S obviously knows when E.D. will be forced from office, and justification is obviously necessary for knowledge, and because S has no adequate reason to support her belief, the justification of a belief cannot require its being supported by adequate reason.[23]

Now Peacocke's reasons for rejecting reliabilism are reported in terse fashion, he objects to ''pure reliabilism'' because of, ''its omission of any rationality or entitlement requirement'' (1999, p. 241); but (on a natural reading) this statement does seem to capture the motivation for reaction (A). So it seems that Peacocke thinks that knowledge requires justification, and that believing that p is only justified if one has good, undefeated epistemic *reasons* for believing that p. Anyone with a similar reaction to the case of the infallible psychic will conclude that even if introspective beliefs are infallible this does not mean that they are grounded by reasons, and will go on to insist that an introspective belief must possess rational grounds if it is to count as knowledge. If a constitutivist account does not require our introspective knowledge to have the backing of reasons, it is unacceptable for those who share the intuitions behind reaction (A).

I think that these internalist intuitions are correct, and that the case of the infallible psychic presents a decisive objection to the view that our introspective beliefs are both groundless and count as knowledge. If my introspective beliefs were not grounded in reasons, if they were *merely* caused, then, while a

third-party could have reasons for thinking that I believe that p, I could have no reasons of my own. Forming second-order introspective beliefs in the typical way would be utterly irrational in such a case; reason would instead advise that I turn to testimony to form well-grounded views of what I believe. But this surely is not how things stand. We are not in the position of the infallible psychic who just finds herself believing things about the future for no good reason; we do not simply find ourselves believing that we believe some things and not others.

What then must be added to a constitutivist's two theses to answer Peacocke's criticism? If one cannot endorse reaction (B) or (C), one must claim that when a subject knows what she believes, her introspective knowledge will be grounded in epistemic reasons, where, to avoid embracing the perceptual model, these reasons cannot be the sort provided for our observational beliefs by our perceptual experiences. By endorsing this claim the constitutivist can avoid the third horn of the trilemma, "by observation, by inference, or by nothing".

Consider, then, the following account of a normal subject's reason for believing that she believes that p.

(III) When S knows that she believes that p (in the first-person way) her reason for believing that she believes that p will be the very fact that she believes that p.

Note that (III) describes a plausible reason for belief even according to theories of knowledge that require beliefs to possess robustly internalist forms of justification. Consider one such view of justification:

(Accessibilism): S is justified in believing that p if and only if S has *accessible* to her an epistemic reason for believing that p that is not defeated by any other reason that is accessible to her.

We are to suppose (as Peacocke surely does) that in the absence of any reason for believing that I believe that p I would not be justified in believing that I believe that p. If the fact that a subject has the beliefs she in fact has is among the facts accessible to her, then the reason described by (III) will provide a "minimal" reason for belief. In the relevant case then, the fact

that I believe that p will provide me with a reason for believing that I believe that p, and (according to Accessibilism) it will therein *justify* my believing that I believe that p.

Thus it might seem as though all that must be added to constitutivism to answer Peacocke is the claim that normal subjects have reasons for believing they have the beliefs they believe themselves to have, where a subject's reason for believing that she believes that p will be the very fact that she believes that p. The upshot is that if his criticism is to have any teeth, Peacocke must endorse a view of justification even more demanding than that provided by Accessibilism, and this makes it clear that Peacocke's rejection of reliabilism is not enough to ground a substantive argument against the constitutivist. A realist constitutivist, like Shoemaker, might accept Accessibilism (which is clearly *not* a reliabilist account of justification), and accept that the sort of justification it requires is necessary for knowledge, without abandoning any part of his mereological, non-perceptual, non-inferential account of self-knowledge, while an anti-realist constitutivist, like Wright's Wittgenstein, need only abandon the view that avowals of belief are groundless.[24]

The matter does not end here. That is, I don't think that Peacocke's criticism can be answered by simply claiming that our first-order beliefs themselves ground our second-order introspective beliefs, and this is because Peacocke has an even more demanding view of epistemic justification than that captured by Accessibilism. It is, I think, this stronger view of justification that drives Peacocke's dissatisfaction with both of the constitutivist theories on hand. The more demanding view begins by claiming that only *directly* accessible reasons have an impact on whether a belief is justified, and then adds the claim that the only directly accessible reasons are facts involving a subject's *conscious experience*.

(Direct Accessibilism): S is justified in believing that p only if: (a) S has a directly accessible epistemic reason for believing that p that is not defeated by any other reason directly accessible to her, where (b) the only reasons directly accessible to S are facts concerning S's conscious experience.

Let us agree, for the time being, that the fact that S believes that p at t is not (or need not be) a fact concerning S's conscious experience at *t*. The substantive questions that then separate Peacocke from the constitutivist concern what sorts of facts are directly accessible. The constitutivist should claim that in any sense of "directly accessible" on which Direct Accessibilism is at all plausible, there are facts that are directly accessible that are not facts concerning a subject's experience.[25] And it looks as though Peacocke must deny this claim if he is to formulate the premises of a substantive argument against constitutivism as follows:

The Argument from Direct Accessibility

(i) The only facts directly accessible to S are facts about S's conscious experience.

(ii) The fact that S believes that p is not a fact about S's conscious experience.

Therefore,

(iii) If S's only reason for believing that she believes that p is the fact that she believes that p then S does not have a directly accessible reason for believing that she believes that p.

(iv) If S does not have a directly accessible reason for believing that she believes that p, then (via Direct Accessibilism) S is not justified in believing that she believes that p.

(v) Since justification is necessary for knowledge, S does not, in such a case, know that she believes that p.

4. OCCURENT VS. NON-OCCURENT PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

The second premise of the argument from direct accessibility claims that the fact that a subject has some particular belief is not a fact concerning her conscious experience. This claim obviously needs to be clarified and defended. Consider the following example as a first stab at clarification. Today is June 15th. For the last two weeks I have believed that it is the month of June; this belief persisted even when I had no occurrent thoughts about the date. Now consider my state of mind last week, while I am eating dinner and thinking about nothing but

the food before me. At that time I believe that it is June, but the belief is not, in some sense, ''conscious'' or ''occurrent''. According to Peacocke, this classification reflects the fact that my belief at that time neither: (a) affects ''what it is like for me'', nor (b) consumes any part of my attention.[26]

Conscious, occurrent *judgments*, on the other hand, do occupy attention and must be cited in an accurate characterization of what things are like for a subject at a time. Suppose I try to remember my grandmother's maiden name, or I weigh the evidence for and against anthropogenic climate change; when, on the basis of these mental efforts, I judge that the name is ''Solomon'' or that the climatic evidence suggests imminent trouble for the environment, my attention is at least partially occupied, and the fact that I have been engaged in mental activity of the sort in question is part of what things have been like for me. Not that all occurrent propositional attitudes must be preceded by mental acts like ''trying'' to remember or ''weighing'' the evidence—an image of the Earth boiling might just pop into my mind unbidden; still if I am imagining that the Earth will boil, and this imagining occupies my attention and partially constitutes what things are like for me, the imagining is an occurrent, conscious attitude I bear toward the proposition that the Earth will boil.

Peacocke clearly thinks that judgments (conceived of in this way) can give us reasons for belief, reasons that can justify our second-order introspective beliefs:

> Conscious thoughts and occurrent attitudes, like other conscious mental events, can give the thinker reasons for action and judgment. They do so also in the special case in which they give the thinker a reason for self-ascribing an attitude to the content which occurs to the thinker, provided our thinker is conceptually equipped to make the self-ascription. (1999, p. 214)[27]

But if Peacocke thinks that conscious judgments are *necessary* for the justification of the relevant introspective beliefs, he must also think that non-occurrent attitudes *cannot* provide reasons for our introspective beliefs. Does he have an argument for this negative thesis? Though he does not explicitly address this

question, there are comments that suggest an argument along the following lines:

The Argument from Analogy

Suppose we reject the "spurious trilemma". We then need to make sense of the idea that our second-order introspective beliefs are not inferred on the basis of anything, and are not based on inner perception of our first-order beliefs, but are not "groundless" or based on nothing. The only way to get a grip on the sort of grounding that our knowledge of what we believe possesses is by way of a comparison with our knowledge of our own sensations.

Suppose we have rejected not just a perceptual model of our knowledge of our beliefs, but a perceptual model of our knowledge of our sensations as well. It would be absurd to then suggest that because S's belief that she is in pain is not based on her perception of her pain it must be based on nothing; that S has *no reason* for thinking she is in pain. There is, after all, something rational that distinguishes S from the deluded hypochondriac: i.e. real pain. But S's belief that she is in pain need not result from an inference. An inference would have to contain the premise that she is in pain, and would therefore be baldly question-begging (1999, p. 215). So we should say that S's belief has a non-inferential though rational ground. S's reason for believing that she is in pain is the very fact that she is in pain—the fact that she has an experience with a certain phenomenal character.

If we wanted to understand our knowledge of what we believe on an analogy with our knowledge of our pain, we might suppose that some distinct fact about our experience provides introspective knowledge of belief with a non-inferential ground. Since non-occurrent beliefs do not occupy our attention and do not contribute to what it is like for us (at least while they are non-occurrent) the fact that one has such a belief is not a fact concerning one's experience. The supposition that such states could provide sufficient reasons or non-inferential grounds for our second-order introspective beliefs would therefore introduce a substantive disanalogy between our basic knowledge of our sensations and our knowledge of our beliefs, and would therefore, to some extent, undercut an explanation of the latter by way of a comparison with the former. So the only way to understand non-inferential grounds for introspective beliefs rules out non-occurrent belief from the start.

Now, if reasoning of this sort does lie behind Peacocke's rejection of constitutivism, it is not difficult to resist. For though the comparison with first-person knowledge of sensation must hold in some respects if we are to understand our knowledge of our beliefs as reason-based but non-inferential,

the comparison need not hold in all respects. That is, it may be the fact that pain partially constitutes how things are for a subject and partially captures that subject's attention that accounts for its role as a non-inferential ground, but this is not obvious. Indeed, it might be that a sensation of pain can provide a subject with a sufficient non-inferential ground for believing that she is in pain in virtue of that sensation's being a *directly accessible* mental state of that subject; and it may be that "direct accessibility" can be understood in such a way that non-occurrent states can be directly accessible.

One way to establish such an understanding would be to equate direct accessibility with what Ned Block calls "access consciousness" rather than "phenomenal consciousness" and argue that a state that is not phenomenally conscious for S at t can be access conscious for S at t.[28] According to Block, a state is phenomenally or *P-conscious* when it at least partially constitutes what things are like for a subject, while a state is access or *A-conscious*

> if it is poised for direct control of thought and action … a representation is A-conscious if it is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct 'rational' control of action and speech. (1997, p. 382)

Are there mental states that are A-conscious without being P-conscious? One might think that a blindsighted patient lacks P-consciousness of perceptual information that is still A-conscious to an extremely limited degree, for though she will report having no phenomenal experience of things in her blind field, and though she will not, e.g., reach for a glass of water in her blind field when she is thirsty, perceptual information about this region is still poised to guide a form of verbal behavior: i.e. forced-choice "guessing".[29]

But exotic examples of this sort are not needed to demonstrate the possibility of A-conscious *beliefs* (rather than perceptual states) that are stripped of P-consciousness. Consider a variation on a case described by Mark Crimmins.[30] At time t as I put my watch in my pocket in order to wash up for dinner, I consciously, occurrently judge that my watch is in my pocket by "making a mental note of it". At $t+1$, while I am eating and

thinking only of my food, I am not judging that my watch is in my pocket, but if I wanted to know the time, I would immediately reach into my pocket and retrieve the watch. (This action might be proceeded by my saying to myself "I wonder what time it is; I'll check the watch in my pocket", but it needn't be.) Finally, at $t+2$, though information concerning the watch's location is still stored in my memory, I neglect that information as I search the house for the watch; it is only at $t+3$ when this information "pops up" or "comes to me" that I halt my search by taking the watch from my pocket.

It seems that at t the judgment that my watch is in my pocket is both P-conscious and A-conscious, while at $t+1$ my belief that the watch is in my pocket *is A-conscious but not P-conscious*, for though its content does not then occupy my attention, it is *available* in a way that is absent when, at $t+2$, I search the house for the watch. (Of course, the memory representation of the watch's location eventually returns to both A-consciousness and P-consciousness at $t+3$ when I then actively remember where I put the watch.) Now one might think that A-consciousness is not really a form of consciousness, or that it is not the sort of consciousness that finds its way into the most difficult philosophical problems about the relation between mind and body. But this is not the issue. Even if states that are A-conscious without being P-conscious are not, in some sense, "really conscious", they may still provide reasons for belief. Indeed, beliefs that are A-conscious without being P-conscious surely play an important rationalizing role in the practical case by providing reasons for the vast majority of our actions (i.e. all actions that do not flow directly from explicit, occurrent deliberation), so it hard to see why they cannot play a similar role in the theoretical case by rationalizing our introspective beliefs.

Again, Peacocke does not explicitly formulate the argument from analogy,[31] and he never claims outright that states must be P-conscious to provide epistemic reasons, but something like this claim seems to be assumed in many of the comments he does make, as when he writes

conscious states can give reasons, and there is equally no evident reason to deny that, for a conceptually equipped thinker, they give reasons for a self-ascription of the attitudes they are, with the contents they have. If one state gives a thinker's reason for a second-state, they must be distinct states, and the reason giving character of this explanation places it at the personal, not the sub-personal level. These points rule out the no-reasons theory. (1999, p. 231)

Non-occurrent beliefs are personal, not sub-personal states. They are attributed to subjects, not the underlying cognitive mechanisms that underwrite perception, thought and memory on the part of subjects. (Even though I am completely focused on my meal, the belief that it is June is correctly attributed to *me*, not a sub-personal cognitive system.) And our first-order, non-occurrent beliefs are somewhat distinct from our second-order introspective beliefs in their existence. Though the realist constitutivist thinks the two states (or their realizers) are mereologically related, she insists that they are not identical.[32] So Peacocke must have some other factor in mind. If non-occurrent beliefs are not sufficient reasons for belief, if P-conscious judgments are indeed required, it must be because the latter are similar to sensations and other qualitative phenomena in a way that the former are not. What Peacocke needs, though, is some reason for supposing that the phenomenal dissimilarity between non-occurrent beliefs and sensations has the epistemic consequences he presupposes it does.

Of course, to point out that Peacocke has no compelling argument for his assumption that P-consciousness is necessary for direct-accessibility is not yet to show that A-consciousness is indeed sufficient for it. In the absence of transcendental argumentation, this positive claim can only be established with particular examples. We must ask, ''Are there cases in which a subject has an A-conscious belief that p, and has no distinct reasons to think that she does not believe that p, where, intuitively, she would *not* be justified in believing that she believes that p? And if there is such a case, is the subject involved prevented from securing justification for her introspective belief by the lack of a *directly accessible reason*?'' To answer negatively is to insist that if one truly believes that one believes that

p, and one's belief that p is A-conscious, one could only fail to be justified in believing that one believes that p if one failed to meet a *non-internalistic* condition on justification. This might happen if the fact that one A-consciously believed that p failed to be causally or constitutively connected to one's introspective belief, and we assume (in a non-internalistic fashion) that a ground must be causally or constitutively connected to a belief if it is to play a role in justifying it. It is at least *difficult* to imagine a subject who believes that p in a fully A-conscious manner—where this belief is poised to guide her inferences and behavior in all the customary ways—and who is also caused to believe that she believes that p by the fact that she believes that p, but who is nevertheless unjustified in believing that she has this belief. And this lends considerable *prima facie* support to the claim that A-consiousness is sufficient for direct accessibility.

But positive support for the sufficiency of A-consciousness for direct accessibility is not in fact necessary for the argumentative purposes at hand. Peacocke's criticisms of the constitutivist account do not even get off the ground if he does not hold that directly accessible reasons are necessary for justification. So if we can show that requiring P-consciousness for direct accessibility has untenable consequences, we can answer Peacocke's criticisms and clear the room for a functionalist alternative to his account. I propose to do this in what follows.

5. A REASONS SHORTAGE

By limiting epistemic reasons to conscious, occurrent states Peacocke shoulders a fairly serious theoretical burden. There is, for instance, a standard objection to internalist accounts of justification that argues that internalism is committed to skepticism on the grounds that it restricts the range of "justifiers" too narrowly. One challenge of this sort is raised by Alvin Goldman with what he calls "the problem of stored beliefs".[33]

Again consider my mental state on June 10th while I am eating and thinking of nothing but the food before me. Do I

then know that I believe that it is June? Of course I do. Am I then justified in believing that I believe it is June? Of course. But because I am not then occurrently judging that it is June, I seem to lack what Peacocke says I need if I am to be justified in believing that I believe that it is June. So it seems that I cannot really know that I have this belief. But any epistemological view committed to saying that my non-occurrent, second-order introspective belief is unjustified in this case is surely false.

A natural response to the problem of stored beliefs would be to insist that 'directly accessible' does not mean occurrent or P-conscious. In order for some reason for S's belief at *t* to be directly accessible to S at *t* it need not be part of S's phenomenally conscious experience at *t*, it need only be A-conscious, or poised to contribute to theoretical reasoning, practical deliberation, and action. As I eat it is true of me that my potential reasoning and action would reflect my belief that it is June: if, e.g., I thought about what to wear tomorrow, I would not decide on a heavy sweater, and if someone were to ask me the month, I would directly assert (or, at least, think) "It is June". Facts of this sort, it might be said, show that my belief that it is June is A-conscious and that I therefore have a directly accessible justification for my belief that I believe that it is June.

But Peacocke cannot avail himself of this response if he is to insist that non-occurrent beliefs cannot provide reasons for our second-order introspective beliefs, for the natural response makes use of reasons for belief that are non-occurrent. So it seems that Peacocke must either admit that our non-occurrent beliefs can be our reasons for believing that we have those beliefs, in which case the justificatory role for occurrent judgment becomes otiose, or he must accept the skeptical conclusion that I only know that I believe that it is June while I am judging that it is June and that I lose this knowledge when I turn to matters other than the date. The second option is clearly the less attractive of the two; Peacocke just cannot say that as I eat dinner I have no reason for believing that I believe that it is June.

Peacocke does not directly address this sort of non-occurrent introspective knowledge perhaps because he writes of *self-attributions* of belief rather than introspective beliefs them-

selves, and self-attributions seem to take place on those particular occasions during which one asserts (or at least formulates the explicit judgment) that one believes that p. But Peacocke does discuss what he calls "no intermediate conscious state" or "NICS" self-attributions in which a subject makes the self-ascription, "I believe that p", without first taking the time and attention necessary to occurrently judge that p. He endorses what he calls an "alternative account" of such cases:

> This alternative account says that an NICS self-ascription of (say) a belief that p is knowledge only if it is made in circumstances in which the thinker is also willing to make the first-order judgment that p. We can call the requirement appealed to in this alternative account the requirement of first-order ratifiability. (1999, p. 241)

Here it seems that Peacocke is willing to admit that non-occurrent beliefs *can* provide reasons for believing in their existence, but that they can only do so in certain circumstances: circumstances, as he says, in which one is willing to make the relevant first-order judgment. But why would a constitutivist deny that? Indeed, only someone skeptical of the existence of occurrent judgments would have any grounds for denying this claim. Even with the rough characterization of "occurrent judgment" with which we are working, it seems to be a constitutive fact about believing that p that if one considers the matter—if one's attention is occupied with whether or not p—one will judge that p. So if a subject has the belief that p, which she must if it is to provide her with a reason (indeed the reason) for believing that she believes that p, she must be willing to judge that p. The mere willingness to judge, therefore, adds nothing substantive to the introspective grounds the constitutivist should already accept.

But Peacocke does not stop with the claim that first-order ratifiability is required for first-person knowledge of belief. He also advances a claim about its *explanatory priority*:

> If first-order ratifiability is the correct explanation of how NICS self-ascriptions can constitute knowledge, then in order of philosophical explanation—as opposed to frequency of examples—the intermediate conscious-state cases [in which self-ascriptions are made on the basis of

occurrent judgments] are philosophically more fundamental than their NICS counterparts. *If first-order ratifiability is required for these cases to be knowledge,* as I am inclined to believe*, then NICS cases count as knowledge* (*when they do*) *because of the relation in which they stand to conscious first-order attitudes*, *and to the rational basis those conscious first-order attitudes provide for self-ascribing attitudes*. On this approach, then, the existence of NICS self-ascriptions which constitute knowledge can be squarely acknowledged without embracing a purely reliabilist epistemology. (my emphasis, 1999, p. 242)

Again, reliabilism is beside the point. The question is whether second-order beliefs can be non-inferentially grounded in non-occurrent beliefs: one can think that they can be so grounded without thinking their justification must be accounted for in purely reliabilist terms. And it is hard to see why Peacocke thinks that the requirement of first-order ratifiability is itself enough to show that second-order introspective beliefs not formed on the basis of conscious, occurrent judgments are justified because of "the relation they stand to such [possible, non-actual] conscious first-order attitudes". Take the case in which I actually do spend the time and energy necessary to: (a) consciously consider whether or not p, (b) consciously conclude (i.e. judge) that p, (c) self-ascribe the belief that p (by, e.g., sincerely asserting "I believe that p!"), and only then move on to consider other matters. Why not say that it is only because the judgment in (b) initiates a state of belief—a state that confers upon me various dispositions essential to the causal role of belief—that it plays its justificatory role? Why not say that it is the fact that I then have these essential dispositions, and, thus instantiate certain non-phenomenal properties essential to believing that p, that explains why my judgment that p provides a reason for believing that I believe that p and not *vice versa*?

In fact, Peacocke casts some doubt on the explanatory priority of occurrent judgments (or one's willingness to occurrently judge) when he admits the possibility (indeed, the actuality) of *false* self-ascriptions predicated on occurrent judgments:

Someone may judge that undergraduate degrees from countries other than her own are of an equal standard to her own, and excellent reasons may be

operative in her assertions to that effect. All the same, it may be quite clear, in decisions she makes on hiring, or in making recommendations, that she does not really have this belief at all. In making a self-ascription of a belief on the basis of a conscious judgment, one is relying on the holding of the normal relations between judgment and belief which are not guaranteed to hold. The methods of coming to make self-ascriptions which I have been discussing are by no means infallible. (1999, p. 242–243)

Here it seems that a subject's occurrent judgment that p only provides her with a reason for believing that she believes that p because when "normal relations" hold it instills (or sustains) the belief that p. If the normal relations between a subject's judgments and her beliefs were to break down, that subject's judgments would be an extremely poor indication of her beliefs, and (once this breakdown became apparent) that subject's judging that p would not provide her with a reason to believe that she believes that p. It should be clear, though, that no similar failing could affect those of her second-order introspective beliefs that are grounded in the very beliefs (non-occurrent or otherwise) that make them true.

If both the A-conscious belief that p and the P-conscious judgment that p can provide a subject with a reason for believing that she believes that p, and it is only the A-conscious belief and not the P-conscious judgment that ensures the truth of the subject's second-order introspective belief, shouldn't we say that the P-conscious judgment plays its reason-providing role because of its relation to the A-conscious belief? If the relations between judgment and belief can indeed break down, it is even less clear why we must instead say that a subject's first-order non-occurrent belief provides an epistemic reason because of its relation to her willingness to perform a first-order judgment.

6. ARE OCCURRENT JUDGMENTS *PURELY* PHENOMENAL?

The introspective error Peacocke asks us to attribute to the unfair academic raises a difficult interpretive question: What is the notion of judgment with which Peacocke is operating? The academic is supposed to occurrently *judge* that undergraduate

degrees from countries other than her own are of an equal standard to her own without *believing* that this is so. But what is judgment, if judging that p does not entail believing that p?

Peacocke introduces the notion of an occurrent judgment through examples: its *occurring* to you, on the basis of recollection, that Dubcek was Prime Minister when Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Soviet Union; its suddenly *striking* you that you've left the tap running; your *concluding* in thought that Smith would be the best person for the job (1999, p. 206). The mental acts or states in question are then argued to have two features in virtue of which they can be said to be conscious or occurrent; again: (a) they partially constitute what it is like for the subject, and (b) they partially occupy that subject's attention. But to say that these two features hold of occurrent judgments is not to say that they exhaust the nature of judging. Indeed, it seems that another essential feature of a subject's occurrently judging that p is that, as of her judging, she believes that p. It may, in some sense, *strike* you that you've left the tap running, but if you know this thought to be neurotic and you have enough control over your neuroses, you will refrain from judging that the tap is running. If you can *see* that the conclusion of some thought process means that Smith is best for the job, but you have independent reasons for thinking that Smith is not best for the job, you will refrain from concluding (i.e. judging) that Smith is best for the job. If you seem to recall that Dubcek was Prime Minister, but you don't trust your memory, its *occurring* to you that Dubcek was Prime Minister is not enough for you to judge that Dubcek was Prime Minister—occurrence without belief just is not judgment. In each such case one enjoys an experience similar to that present when one takes one's memories and deliberations "at face value" but because one does not come to *believe* the proposition in question one's mental act is not one of judging that proposition true.

So we cannot say that the subject Peacocke discusses *judges* that undergraduate degrees from countries other than her own are of an equal standard to her own without *believing* that this is so. Why then does Peacocke say this? His error, I think, stems from the puzzle the case raises for those committed to a view of

beliefs as states that cause and rationalize behavior. Given that the subject in question has sincerely judged that p, how can she be said to believe that p when her discriminatory behavior shows that she is not disposed to act and reason in the ways we think essential to believing that p?

An extremely attractive description of the case opens up if we say that the dispositions that are strictly necessary for belief are conditional upon the presence of *attention* and *resolution*. If we say that S believes that p only if she is so disposed that were she fully attentive and resolute she would act on the information that p, and we allow that an agent's tendency to neglect p when absent-minded or weak-willed does not necessarily imply that she fails to believe p, we will say that S's hiring behavior at $t + n$ only shows that she does not then believe in the equality of American and English degrees *if* she is paying attention to the relevant aspects of the situation and not suffering from weakness of will. Though Peacocke does not describe the case in enough detail to assess whether this necessary condition is met, it is quite possible that S fails to consider whether or not she might be giving undue influence to the home candidate. If she does not consider this matter—if her attention is not fully "turned toward it"—then (according to this metaphysical account of belief) her discriminatory behavior is fully compatible with her possessing a non-discriminatory belief.

But we needn't accept this characterization of the dispositions that are truly essential to belief; there are other ways in which we can describe the prejudicial academic without violating the entailment from judgment to belief. We might say that the subject, S, judges that p at t, and believes that p at t, but as soon as she moves on to think of other things she loses the belief that p. Adopting this description enables us to say both: (a) that (necessarily) beliefs are states that play a certain causal role, where nothing could play this role without bestowing certain conditional dispositions to act in certain ways; and (b) that one cannot judge that p without believing that p. The idea would be that because *at t* S possesses the dispositions essential to belief that p she does at that time believe that p, but she is never actually in a position to act on

these fleeting dispositions because her hiring and letter-writing behavior is never accompanied by the relevant occurrent judgment. If S were to keep the judgment that p "in mind", we might say, she could not fail to have these dispositions; it is only when her attention is diverted to other matters that she is susceptible to changes in belief. While S judges that American degrees are as valuable as English degrees she could not, e.g., intentionally place more value on one degree qua English than on another qua American, because while S judges the relevant proposition true, she must have the dispositions essential to belief in its truth. But when, at some later time, her mind is diverted, and she is not occurrently judging that American degrees are as valuable as their English counterparts, she may not believe that they are.

Alternatively, we might attribute the academic's unfair hiring to her failure to draw the relevant inference. We might say that S believes that degrees from foreign institutions are just as good as her own and she wants to hire the best candidate for the job, but insist that S does not believe that *her* actions jeopardize the achievement of her end, because she does not realize that the foreign candidate she passes over is superior to the domestic candidate she favors. Surely when S utters, "Foreign degrees are just as good as domestic ones", she expresses a different proposition than she would were she to utter, "Foreign candidate A is better than domestic candidate B". So it is fully compatible with S's using the former proposition to guide her actions and deliberations that she fail to use the latter. Of course, it may be obvious that what S is doing is discriminatory. It may be obvious that in the circumstances in question S ought to infer that A is better than B from her belief in the equality of the two degrees and her appreciation of the remaining evidence. If this inference is obvious, S's hiring practices will manifest culpable ignorance; we will then want to say that S is irrational for not applying her general belief to the case at hand. But we must be careful to distinguish culpable ignorance from flat-out lying. We respect this distinction when we say that while the liar does not have the belief she pretends to have, the subject who does not realize the prejudicial nature

of her actions fails to draw the inferences to which her non-prejudicial belief commits her.

But Peacocke does not accept any of these explanations of the case, for he insists that S's occurrent judgment that p may provide the ground for her *false* belief that she believes that p. To reconcile something of this view with the unassailable fact that if a subject judges that p at *t* that subject believes that p at *t*, Peacocke would be forced to introduce a new category of mental state: *seeming-judgments*. A seeming judgment would be the mental state of someone whose experience (or conscious state) is exactly like that of someone who does judge that p, but who, because she lacks the cognitive and behavioral dispositions necessary for belief that p, does not really judge that p.[34]

Now if this notion is coherent, there is nothing inconsistent in supposing that S *seemingly judges* that p and does not believe that p; but it is not at all clear why mere seeming-judgments (if there are such) should provide basic or non-inferential grounds for our second-order introspective beliefs. Is it because when "normal relations hold" seeming-judgments really are judgments and really do instill or sustain beliefs? What is the nature of these normal relations? Since their holding is a contingent matter, so too is the existence of first-person authority. It would seem possible, on this account, for all of a subject's second-order beliefs to be grounded in what merely seem to be judgments, in which case all of that subject's second-order introspective beliefs would be false (though, presumably, justified).

Indeed, the contingency brought into the account by the introduction of seeming-judgments points to a deeper problem, for it marks a return to the perceptual model of introspection that Peacocke wants to avoid. The perceptual model can be found in the significant disanalogy that seeming-judgments create between knowledge of our beliefs and knowledge of our sensations. My knowledge of the fact that I feel pain (rather than my knowledge of the bodily trouble it normally indicates) is directly grounded in the fact that I feel pain; but my knowledge of my belief that p is now supposed to be grounded in the fact that I *seemingly judge* that p. This seeming-judgment is then taken as an *indication* that I do really believe that p; as

such it plays the role that an intermediary ''appearance'' of the feeling of pain would play on what Shoemaker calls the ''object perception model'' of introspection (1996, p. 204–223). So, if we are to truly reject the perceptual model of introspection, we must reject the idea that our knowledge of our second-order beliefs is grounded in seeming-judgments.

Of course there are theorists who embrace the object-perception model. Eric Lormand, for example, confesses

> I think it is *utterly normal*, in becoming aware of one's attitudes, to have accompanying phenomenally conscious 'symptoms' of the attitudes. For example, one's standing unconscious belief *that snow is white* may cause one to from an auditory image of quickly saying the words 'snow is white' … There are normally more aspects to this verbal imagery, which help one to determine which kind and strength of attitude (belief, desire, suspicion, etc.) is revealed via thought. In cases of belief, for instance, one may imagine saying the words in an assertive tone of voice, and without any concomitant proprioceptive sensations of suppressed giggling, or auditory images as of appending 'NOT!,' etc… . It is no part of my proposal that each belief or desire has a *canonical* phenomenal symptom, and I do not here assert (or deny) that *every* bit of attitude self-knowledge proceeds via phenomenal symptoms. But to say the least, we should be very suspicious of any view of introspection that marginalizes such an important and nearly ubiquitous entryway into knowledge of attitudes. (1983, pp. 12–13)[35]

It should be clear, though, that Peacocke could not join Lormand's camp while also avoiding the ''spurious trilemma''—for Lormand's account of self-knowledge of propositional attitudes involves both perception and inference. According to Lormand, we inwardly *perceive* a stream of words bathed in the inner-corollary of assertive force (e.g. ''Snow is white!'') and then *infer* that we believe the proposition these words express.[36] Needless to say, I think both Peacocke and the constitutivist would find Lormand's account phenomenologically inaccurate and theoretically problematic.

The primary problem is not that there is no purely qualitative distinction to be made between judging and other mental acts like imagining, remembering or pretending. That difficulty—the difficulty in identifying what Lormand calls ''a canonical phenomenal symptom'' of judgment, a problem that exercised David Hume to such a degree[37]—is, perhaps, resolvable. But

even if judging does have a unique phenomenal character, if experience with this character were not *sufficient* for belief it could not play the epistemological role Peacocke assigns to it. For if experience with the phenomenal character of genuine judgment is not sufficient for belief, we can have experiences with this phenomenal character that are not real judgments (for they don't initiate, sustain or accompany beliefs). If our second-order introspective beliefs are grounded in such judgment-like experiences, knowledge of our beliefs is not direct, but instead mediated by inconclusive inferential grounds or states of inner perception.

Whether the use of seeming-judgments would commit Peacocke to a perceptual or, instead, an inferentialist model of introspection, depends on which features of perception are taken to define the perceptual model. If we say that our second-order introspective beliefs are based on seeming-judgments, we must then make a distinction between what we introspectively *appear* to believe and what we *really* do believe. If the introduction of an introspective appearance/reality distinction itself qualifies as a slide into the perceptual model, then a commitment to seeming-judgments carries with it a commitment to inner sense. Perhaps, though, the introduction of an appearance/reality distinction is not enough; perhaps an account of introspective belief must attribute to introspection more features of paradigmatic perception if that account is to truly qualify as a variety of the inner sense view. But even if seeming-judgments are not thought of as analogous to perceptual appearances, they are still only *contingent* signs of belief. One's knowledge that one has seemingly judged that p is not *itself* knowledge that one believes that p. So there must be some description of the cognitive transition between appreciating the fact that one has seemingly judged that p and judging that one actually does believe that p. If this cognitive move is not one of taking the quasi-perceptual appearance that one is judging that p at face value (as the inner sense model would have it) it must consist in concluding that one believes that p from the premise that one seemingly judges that p. So if he claims that mere seeming-judgments ground our introspective beliefs Peacocke

can avoid the perceptual model only by embracing inferentialism. The contingent connection between seemingly judging that p and believing that p means that seeming-judgments must either play the epistemic role that appearances play in justifying our perceptual beliefs or the role premises play in justifying beliefs based on inference.

Of course, when he rejects all *three* prongs of the spurious trilemma, Peacocke claims to avoid both inferentialist and perceptual accounts of introspection. It seems, though, that adoption of one at least one of these views is the price to be paid for denying that our second-order introspective beliefs have conclusive grounds.[38] Peacocke is driven to adopt a perceptual or inferentialist model of introspection—views he desperately wants to avoid—because he acknowledges that the possession of certain cognitive and behavioral dispositions is necessary for belief, and it is difficult to see how an experience with a certain phenomenal character (i.e. the experience that marks judging something true) could necessitate the possession of such dispositions. It is because the prejudicial academic Peacocke describes has a judgment-like phenomenal experience but lacks what Peacocke presumes to be necessary behavioral and cognitive dispositions, that Peacocke is forced to view the case as one in which a judgment is made in the absence of belief. But this view is clearly untenable.

7. RESTATING THE CASE

To recap: Peacocke tries to argue that occurrent judgments play a necessary epistemic role that mere beliefs cannot insofar as judgments constitute non-inferential grounds for our second-order introspective beliefs. The argument requires showing that conscious, occurrent judgments can provide non-inferential grounds, but that non-occurrent beliefs can only do so in virtue of their relation to possible occurrent judgments (or a subject's "willingness" to make such judgements). There is a real phenomenal distinction between the two sorts of state, but Peacocke needs to show that this phenomenal distinction has the

epistemic consequences he supposes it does. If S's judging that p does not imply that S believes that p, then perhaps S's judgment can be sufficiently characterized in phenomenal terms: i.e. in terms of "what it is like" for S while she judges, and the ways in which her attention is engaged on such occasions. But such an account is implausible because one cannot judge that p without believing that p, where beliefs are individuated by causal roles that can only be adequately characterized in terms that are at least partly non-phenomenal. If genuine judgment is replaced in the account with some state or act that is stipulated to be that part of judging for which the occurrence of a certain conscious experience is sufficient—i.e. a seeming-judgment—a contingent intermediary is placed between a subject's first-order beliefs and her introspective beliefs in their existence. This forces acceptance of a problematic perceptual or inferentialist model of introspective knowledge of belief, views Peacocke takes great pains to avoid.

If, on the other hand, S's judging that p does imply that S believes that p, then occurrent judgments cannot be assimilated to sensations and other arguably essentially phenomenal states.[39] A subject will then only really judge that p at *t* if she then enjoys a cognitive state that represents p and satisfies enough of the causal role of a paradigm state of belief, and this will include her having cognitive and behavioral dispositions that do not impinge on her immediate experience. But to argue that judgments so understood are directly accessible while beliefs are not would be unmotivated. For the fact that one has judged that p in the robust sense in which judging that p implies believing that p is not just a fact about one's phenomenal experience or current state of consciousness, but a fact that centrally concerns one's cognitive and behavioral dispositions. The fact that a subject (non-occurrently) believes that p is also a fact of exactly this kind. Both the fact that S is judging that p at t and the fact that S non-occurrently believes that p at *t* are facts that outstrip what things are like for S at *t*, so either both sorts of fact can provide non-inferential grounds for second-order introspective belief, or neither can.

8. DISJUNCTIVISM

Peacocke's view points out just how difficult it is to avoid the perceptual model. It seems that part of what leads him back to this way of thinking is his implicit assumption that the single alternative to a "Cartesian" epistemology (a view according to which the only non-inferential reasons for belief are facts concerning one's occurrent, conscious experience) is reliabilism. This is indeed a spurious dilemma. The third option is to hold that when our second-order introspective beliefs are formed and maintained in a first-person way they are grounded in the very first-order mental states that make them true. Of course, if our typical introspective beliefs are grounded in their truth-makers, there can be no false introspective beliefs that nevertheless possess the kind of justification we have for our typical introspective beliefs. The constitutivist must therefore argue that our second-order introspective beliefs are *infallible relative to their grounds*—where a belief is infallibile relative to its grounds if and only if the reasons supporting that belief ensure its truth. According to the constitutivist, then, if one *falsely* believes that one believes that p, and one manages to secure grounds for this belief, these grounds will always differ in kind from the grounds we have for our typical, true introspective beliefs.

That the constitutivist must limit her claim to this sort of conditional infallibility follows from the possibility of third-person ways of coming to beliefs about what one believes. Suppose S trusts a reliable though fallible therapist who incorrectly tells her that she believes that p. In such a case S would seem to have a false, though justified belief about what she believes. Still, S's false introspective belief does not challenge the constitutivist's view of introspection because on any plausible way of individuating kinds of grounds for belief, S's grounds for believing that she believes that p differ *in kind* from the grounds we have for our ordinary introspective beliefs. S's reasons for holding her second-order belief differ, for example, from my grounds for believing that I believe the month is June. (S's belief is grounded in testimony, and we needn't assume constitutivism to conclude that my introspective belief is not grounded in *that* sort of evidence.)

Admittedly, the constitutivist is committed to a fully general claim: "that in *every* case in which" a subject falsely believes that she believes that p this subject's belief will resemble S's testimony-based belief in its epistemic pedigree. And to commit oneself to this general claim is to embrace a form of *disjunctivism*. Disjunctivist accounts of perceptual justification argue that the justification with which we hold beliefs on the basis of veridical experience necessarily differs in kind from the justification with which we hold beliefs on the basis of hallucinatory experience.[40] Similarly, the constitutivist view of self-knowledge argues that if we have any false, justified beliefs about what we believe, the grounds for these beliefs will be different in kind from the grounds with which we hold our typical second-order introspective beliefs. The question, though, is whether the commitment to perceptual disjunctivism is problematic, and whether the criticisms that have been leveled against disjunctivist views of perceptual justification might be applied to introspective disjunctivism with equal force. If one finds perceptual disjunctivism unintuitive, should one balk at accepting constitutivism?

The constitutivist should acknowledge that the motivations for the two views are similar. Disjunctivists typically support their conception of perceptual justification by arguing that it is the only way to avoid both skepticism and simple forms of reliabilism. Perceptual disjunctivism avoids having to embrace reliabilism by allowing that we have accessible grounds for our perceptual knowledge (i.e. veridical experience), and it avoids skepticism by claiming that our grounds for holding our perceptual beliefs would not exist if the external world did not exist. Similarly, introspective disjunctivism avoids the skepticism that results from claiming that our beliefs must have perceptual or inferential justifications, and (by arguing that A-consciousness is sufficient for direct accessibility) it avoids commitment to a reliabilist conception of justification.

Still, while the paths that lead to the two accounts are similar, their entailments are somewhat disparate. Veridical experiences are subjectively indiscriminable from (possible) hallucinatory experiences in a fairly straightforward sense: for every veridical experience there is a possible hallucinatory experience which is

such that a fully reflective subject would be unable to notice a change from the one to the other. This is so whether we give a phenomenal or (narrow) functionalist account of what it is for a subject to be able to *notice* that such a change has occurred.[41] Perceptual disjunctivists must therefore find a way to deny the common intuition that states that are subjectively indiscriminable in this sense cannot differ in the kinds of justification they supply. The opponent of perceptual disjunctivism supports her intuitions as follows: If I would not be able to notice a change from a veridical experiential state to a possible hallucinatory state, then I cannot tell whether I am in the one state or the other. And if I cannot tell whether I am in the one state or the other, my evidence or grounds must be neutral as to which type of state I currently occupy. But if the grounds for my perceptual belief included the fact that I am having a *veridical* perceptual experience, my grounds would not be neutral as to which of the two kinds of state I currently occupy. So the fact that my experience is veridical cannot be among the facts that ground my perceptual belief and distinguish its justification from the justification of false perceptual beliefs that arise from hallucinatory experience.

This argument is not obviously compelling; each of its premises can be (and has been) challenged. But it does have enough intuitive force to demand a response from those who advocate disjunctivist accounts of perceptual justification. And this distinguishes perceptual disjunctivism from its introspective counterpart. There is no intuitive sense in which I might move from having an A-conscious belief to lacking this belief without being able to notice that this had occurred. Because A-consciousness is a functional notion a subject who holds the A-conscious belief that p will change in functional terms if she either loses this belief or her belief loses its A-consciousness. And if it is true that a subject with an A-conscious belief must be so disposed that were she to consider the matter she would occurrently and consciously judge that p, then any alteration in a subject's set of A-conscious beliefs will bring with it changes in the kinds of experience to which that subject is prone. There is therefore no reason why a constitutivist should allow that the absence of an A-conscious belief might be subjectively indistinguishable from its presence.

The central argument against perceptual disjunctivism has no direct application to its introspective variant.

9. CONCLUSIONS: INFALLIBILITY AND NORMATIVITY

The constitutivist is committed to the conditional infallibility of introspective knowledge of belief and the disjunctivist account of introspective justification that this view entails. But she need not think that our introspective beliefs count as knowledge *simply because* they possess this conditional infallibility, so she need not adopt a merely reliabilistic or no-reasons epistemology. This is not only because the constitutivist account that I have sketched allows reasons of a sort for a subject's introspective beliefs, but because that account satisfies Accessibilism and thus meets the justificatory conditions imposed by a normative, somewhat internalistic epistemology. The satisfaction of these conditions is insured when the subject forms her introspective beliefs in the normal way, because to believe that one believes that p only when one does believe that p one must conform to a good, truth-conducive epistemic rule. The epistemic justification and freedom from epistemic blame that accompany such conformity can only be sacrificed if the subject adopts a third-person mode of belief—as when someone believes that she believes that p on the basis of testimony.

Peacocke is certainly correct, however, in pointing out the shortcomings of any constitutivist view that explains the grounding or justification of our introspective beliefs in purely reliabilist terms. Typical subjects will only believe that they believe that p when they do believe that p, and this provides a *rational constraint* on higher-order belief formation. If her evidence suggests that not-p, an agent properly bound by epistemic norms will be unable to believe that p, and so will be unable to believe that she believes that p. If her evidence provides an overwhelming indication that p, an agent bound by epistemic norms will be forced to believe (or find it difficult to resist believing) that p, and will find a similar difficulty in resisting the belief that she believes that p. Indeed, even when epistemic reason does not back a subject's first-order beliefs, the presence

of these beliefs will force itself upon an otherwise rational subject. In no event must we say that a normal, rational subject is simply caused to have introspective beliefs without the guidance of reason. Thus it seems that both the reliabilist and Wright's Wittgenstein are wrong in supposing that I simply find myself believing that I believe certain things, and that I can be said to know that I have these beliefs even if I have no reason for thinking that I do. It is also clear, however, that nothing *beyond* belief is needed.[42]

NOTES

[1] To claim that the fact that S believes that p is S's reason for believing that she believes that p is not to claim that S (question-beggingly) infers that she believes that p from the premise that she believes that p. The claim is that facts about one's first-order mental states can provide non-inferential reasons for one's introspective beliefs. This will be made clear in what follows.

[2] *Being Known*, Oxford: Clarendon (1999), p. 232; *cf*. Paul Boghossian, "Content and Self-Knowledge", *Philosophical Topics*, 17 (1989), pp. 5–26, at p. 5, and Crispin Wright, "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention", *Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (1989a), pp. 622–634, at p. 631.

[3] Colin McGinn is an important exception; see his *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1984). But though McGinn notes the possibility of basic self-knowledge of beliefs, he does not explain the view or defend it against objections. Roderick Chisholm also claims that the fact that S believes that p can justify S in "counting it as evident" that he believes that p, and states further that beliefs (and all the other propositional attitudes) are "self-presenting"; see his *Theory of Knowledge*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall (1966), pp. 27–30. In later work, however, Chisholm advocates a view according to which we gain introspective knowledge of our beliefs by observing the self that has them; see his "On the Observability of the Self", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30 (1969), pp. 7–21.

[4] I will explain what conditional or relative infallibility is below. It will suffice here to note that a constitutivist will want to allow for cases in which a subject adopts a false justified belief about what she believes on the basis of the testimony of a third-party (e.g. a therapist).

[5] See *The Concept of Mind*, New York: Harper and Row (1949), pp. 169&179. Here Ryle writes of our knowledge of our character and personality traits and our knowledge of what we are doing. It is never clear exactly what he thinks about our knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, sensations, and perceptual experiences.

[6] There are, however, some who are willing to accept self-directed skepticism. See, e.g., Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, Leon S. Roudiez trans., New York; Columbia UP (1991). Alison Gopnik, in "How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 16 (1993), pp. 1–14, argues that our access to our intentional states is inferential, but she waivers over whether the premises of these inferences concern other mental states — e.g. sensations—or behavior. The second (behaviorist) view is a non-starter. I don't need to see what I do to know what I believe, rather I have prior knowledge of what I believe that I can use in deciding what to do. The first sort of inferentialist view will be discussed in what follows.

[7] See Donald Davidson, "Knowing One's Own Mind", *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, 60, (1987), pp. 287–310; Fred Dretske, "Introspection", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 94 (1994), pp. 263–278; and John Heil, "Privileged Access", *Mind* 97 (1988), pp. 238–251. For an attempt to sever the connection between incompatibilism and inner sense see Sven Bernecker, "Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism", *Inquiry*, 39 (1996), pp. 121–139.

[8] See Shoemaker, "Self-Knowledge and 'Inner-Sense'", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LIV (1994), pp. 249–314, reprinted in his *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*, Cambridge: UP (1996).

[9] The notion of a brute error can be found in Tyler Burge's, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", in *Self-Knowledge*, ed. Quassim Cassam, Oxford: UP (1994), pp. 65–80.

[10] As far as I can tell, Shoemaker was the first to point to the logical impossibility of holding a true belief in a Moore paradoxical proposition. See the amended version of his, "Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge", *Philosophical Studies*, 77 (1995), pp. 211–228, which appears in Shoemaker (1996), pp 74–93.

[11] *Varieties of Reference*, John McDowell (ed.), Oxford: UP (1982), pp. 225–226.

[12] See Saul Kripke's weak disquotational principle which states, "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 'p' then he believes that p", in "A Puzzle About Belief", in *The Philosophy of Language*, 3rd Edition, A. P. Martinich (ed.), Oxford: UP (1996), pp. 382–410, at p. 388, reprinted from *Meaning and Use*, A. Margalit (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel (1979), pp. 239–283.

[13] See Crispin Wright, "On Making Up One's Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention", in *Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology*, *Proceedings of the XIth International Wittgenstein Symposium*, P. Weingartner and G. Schurz, eds., Vienna: Holder-Pickler Tempsky (1987), pp. 391–404, "Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics", in Alexander George, (ed.), *Reflections on Chomsky*, New York: Blackwell (1989b), and (1989a), p. 632.

[14] Though the quotation only mentions intentions, the question is directed at our knowledge of intentional states generally. See Crispin Wright, ''Critical Study of Colin McGinn's Wittgenstein on Meaning'', in *Mind*, XCVIII (1989c), pp. 289–305, at p. 293.

[15] There actually is a way that avowals could be reliable and groundless without guaranteeing their own truth: pure reliabilism. One might say that as a matter of psychological fact, first-order beliefs reliably cause both avowals of belief and the appropriate range of behaviors, but that the presence of this mechanism does not provide a *reason* or epistemic *ground* for one's second-order introspective beliefs. The mechanism might be compared to a hypnotist (or evil-scientist) who causes one to have a true belief that is unsupported by reason. (Of course, after the mechanism has operated for some time, a subject will have *inductive* grounds for thinking that her self-ascriptions of belief are reliable, but this is surely not how Wittgenstein pictured things.) I think that Wittgenstein doesn't seriously entertain this view because of his scorn for psychological explanations that posit an ''underlying mechanism'', but I cannot defend that interpretation here. I will, though, address pure reliabilism in what follows.

[16] ''Asked what constitutes the truth of rule-informed judgment of the kind we isolated, the official Wittgensteinian will reply: 'Bad question, leading to bad philosophy—platonism, for instance, or Kripkean skepticism,'" Wright, (1989b, p. 257).

[17] Shoemaker introduces the distinction between core and total realizations in, ''Absent Qualia are Impossible: A Reply to Block'', *Philosophical Review*, 90 (1981), pp. 581–599.

[18] This is, at least in part, an empirical matter. Perhaps if we were to discover that pain is realized to a large degree in neural activity which is in some physical sense ''distinct'' from that neural activity that encodes belief, this would count as a falsification of the hypothesis that pain and the belief that one is in pain share the same core realization.

[19] On the ''partial identity'' of wholes with their parts see D. M. Armstrong, *Universals and Scientific Realism*, vol. II, Cambridge: UP (1978), pp. 37–38; and David Lewis, *Parts of Classes*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1991), pp. 81–88.

[20] See, e.g., Peter Unger ''An Analysis of Factual Knowledge'', *Journal of Philosophy*, 65 (1968), pp. 163–164; Robert Audi, *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, London: Routledge (1998), pp. 229–230; and A.J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, London: Macmillan (1956), pp. 31–32, though Ayer's view of the situation is subsequently hedged with the suggestion that the rule for applying 'know' may not be clear in this case.

[21] For the claim that the psychic would not be justified see Laurence Bonjour, ''Externalist Theories of Knowledge'', in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), *Midwest Studies in*

Philosophy, 5, Minneapolis: UP (1980); and John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield (1986).

[22] Both Audi (1998) and Unger (1968) have this reaction.

[23] Surely, one might say, there is a fourth option; for there *is* a reason for S to believe what she does, namely, the fact that she is an infallible psychic. I agree that this is a reason for S to believe what she does, but I insist that S does not have (or grasp) this reason, and because S does not have this existing reason it cannot ground her particular belief. This is why it is not *rational* for S to form her premonitory belief. I agree with Peacocke's internalist intuitions to this extent: for one to have or grasp a reason, that reason must be accessible to one (in a sense to be explicated below).

[24] To see that Accessibilism is not equivalent to pure reliabilism, note that according to Accessibilism S's premonitory belief is not justified. On plausible assumptions about the structure of reasons, the reasons that prohibit S from believing that E.D. will be deposed on the 25th of October are not defeated by the fact that it has occurred to her that he will then lose office (and, ex hypothesi, nothing else accessible to S bears on the truth of the relevant proposition or has any affect on her belief in its truth).

[25] Alternatively, if Peacocke and the constitutivist were to agree that there is a sense of "directly" in which the only sorts of facts that are directly accessible are facts concerning a subject's conscious experience, their conflict would concern whether reasons must be directly accessible to a subject to ground or justify her beliefs. As "directly accessible" is a term of art, neither formulation is clearly superior.

[26] The use of "what it is like" in philosophical discussions of subjectivity goes back to Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: UP, pp. 165–81. For Peacocke's account of conscious, occurrent attitudes see his (1999, pp. 205–214).

[27] I will use "judgment", "occurrent judgment", or "conscious, occurrent judgment" to denote the states of mind in question rather than "conscious belief" or "occurrent belief', both because of the linguistic oddity of using "belief" to mark an event or action (as with, "He is right now believing that p",) and because "conscious belief" is often used just to denote a belief one knows that one has (and Peacocke wants to allow for introspective knowledge of non-occurrent attitudes).

[28] "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", in *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Bradford, MIT Press (1997), pp. 375-415. On access consciousness see too Jerry Fodor, *The Modularity of Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1983).

[29] Owen Flanagan suggests this description of blindsight in *Consciousness Reconsidered*, Cambridge, MA: Bradford, MIT Press (1992). Block thinks this notion of access consciousness too liberal, but admits, "the notion of

consciousness that I have framed is just one of a family of access notions'' (1997, p. 388).

[30] *Talk About Beliefs*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1992), pp. 72–73.

[31] But see (1999, p. 215) for some textual support.

[32] Peacocke also wants to say that the mechanisms that instantiate first-order beliefs are not wholly distinct from those that realize second-order beliefs (1999, p. 224), and he wants to endorse (or at least be able to endorse) Shoemaker's claim that second-order introspective belief possession supervenes on first-order belief possession plus normal intelligence, rationality and concept possession (1999, p. 233). So the passage at hand cannot be read as objecting to constitutivism on the grounds that a reason (or state of reason-possession) must be *entirely* distinct from the state of belief it grounds.

[33] ''Internalism Exposed'', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 96 (1999), pp. 271–293, at p. 278.

[34] Alvin Plantinga tentatively endorses such a category when he writes ''perhaps what we should say is not that there is an experience of forming or holding the belief in question, but rather a phenomenal *accompaniment* of forming or having the belief in question'', *Warrant and Proper Function*, Oxford: UP (1993), p. 92. Eric Lormand's approval is, however, unequivocal: ''There is nothing conscious attitudes *themselves* are like, although there is often something [that] *accompanying* states are like … perceptual experiences, bodily-sensational experiences, imaginative experiences, and experiences in the stream of thought'', ''Inner Sense Until Proven Guilty'', at http:/www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons/inner_sense.htm, (August, 1983), pp. 1–39, quote on p. 12.

[35] See too A. Goldman, ''The Psychology of Folk Psychology'', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 16 (1993), pp. 15–28.

[36] One could hold that we have direct, non-perceptual knowledge of our phenomenal states and that we use this knowledge to gain inferential access to our beliefs. This is not Lormand's view as he is anxious to defend an *inner sense* model of our introspective access to our sensations and experiences, but it might be Peacocke's. I'll discuss this further in what follows.

[37] See *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 2nd Edition, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: UP (1888, 1978), esp. pp. 84–86 and 94–98.

[38] There is room for a disjunctive view here. It might be that our true, justified second-order introspective beliefs are grounded in one sort of state: judgments, while our false, justified second-order introspective beliefs are grounded in another: seeming-judgments. But this view if not only forced to answer the criticisms that have been raised against disjunctivist views of perceptual justification (criticisms I will discuss below) it also requires a partial adoption of either a perceptual or inferentialist model of introspection. The seeming-judgments on which the disjunctivist says our false, justified introspective beliefs are based must be thought of as either misleading

introspective appearances or inconclusive inferential grounds. Disjunctivism will not help Peacocke escape the spurious trilemma.

[39] Perhaps the occurrence of an experience with a certain phenomenal character is not sufficient for the existence of a sensation that typically has that phenomenal character (though I think this implausible). But even if, e.g., a subject could have an experience with the phenomenal character of pain without experiencing pain, this would not help Peacocke, for it would further assimilate sensations to non-occurrent beliefs and so suggest that either both sensations and non-occurrent beliefs can provide direct or non-inferential grounds for introspective beliefs or that neither can.

[40] Disjunctivism is discussed by J. M. Hinton, *Experiences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1973); P. Snowdown, ''The Objects of Perceptual Experience'', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 64, (1990), pp. 121–150; and W. Child, ''Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Disjunctive Conception'', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 42, (1992), pp. 297–316. John McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP (1994) can plausibly be interpreted as defending a version of disjunctivism, as can Bill Brewer, ''Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge'', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, (1997), pp. 41–56; esp. p. 51. Scott Sturgeon argues against a ''quietist'' version of disjunctivism in ''Visual Experience'', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XCVIII, (1998), pp. 179–200.

[41] A disjunctivist can point to ''wide'' functional differences between hallucinating and veridically perceiving subjects. For example, the veridically perceiving subject will be disposed to grab a glass of water when she is thirsty, and the hallucinating subject won't have that disposition (though she will be disposed to reach for a glass). I won't weigh in on whether this supplies the raw materials for a satisfactory vindication of perceptual disjunctivism, as my aim here is not to argue for or against a disjunctivist account of perceptual justification, but to argue for a disjunctivist account of introspection.

[42] I would like to thank C. Anthony Anderson, Anthony Brueckner, David Chalmers, Emily Esch, Kevin Falvey, Matthew Hanser, Benj Hellie, Terence Irwin, Brendan Jackson, Keith McPartland, Christopher Peacocke, Susanna Siegel, Zoltán Gendler Szabo, and Jennifer Whiting for helpful discussions. Carl Ginet, Delia Graff, and Sydney Shoemaker deserve special thanks for written comments and extensive discussion.

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