

Study Sheet for Final Exam

Part I: These will be short (1-4 sentences) answers. You'll be asked to answer 10 out of 15 of these questions for 2 points each.

1. Name two of the three theses that form the apparently "inconsistent triad" that Davidson tries to reconcile with his anomalous monism.
2. What is the method of doubt? What is Descartes trying to achieve in using this method?
3. Define 'idealism'.
4. Define 'property dualism'.
5. According to Frege, what is the denotation of 'Samuel Clemens' when that name occurs in the following sentence: 'Mary hopes that Samuel Clemens comes home soon'.
6. What is Lichtenberg's objection to Descartes' cogito argument?
7. Define 'numerical identity' and 'qualitative identity'. Provide an example of two things that are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct.
8. Define Cartesian Foundationalism.
9. Explain Frege's distinction between the sense and reference of an expression.
10. Explain the difference between a type and a token of that type using an example.
11. Explain the difference between the fine and broad individuation of a facts and describe sentences that are used to state the same broadly individuated fact but different finely individuated facts.
12. Suppose object o has property P. What does it mean to say that that P is one of o's **essential** properties?
13. Define "type-type identity theory" and provide two examples of plausible type identities.
14. Define "eliminativism" and explain the analysis of mental reports defended by "expressivist eliminativists."
15. Define 'functional property' and give an example of one.
16. Explain what it means to say that a kind of mental state is multiply realizable.
17. Define 'qualia'.
18. Explain the difference between correlating mental events with neurological events and identifying mental events with neurological events.
19. Explain Carnap's theory of belief.
20. Explain the view that qualia are irreducible.
21. Explain Dennett's distinction between the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. Give an example of the application of each stance.
22. Explain the problem of other minds and the behaviorist response to it.
23. Define "proposition."
24. Define "state."
25. Define "causal power."

Part II: You'll be asked to answer 4 out of 5 of these essay questions at 20 points each.

1. Block argues that functionalist theories of the mind are too liberal. Explain and critique Block's arguments. Can a functionalist effectively respond to Block's arguments without abandoning her commitment to the multiple realizability of mental states? Defend your answer with arguments or reasons.
2. Explain Davidson's anomalous monism and his claim that the "apparently inconsistent triad" he describes can be shown to be consistent if we embrace token identity theory along with a denial of type identities and psychophysical laws. Is anomalous monism as form of property dualism? Defend your answer with reasons or arguments.
3. Explain the "common road to qualia" taken by those who argue for qualia on the basis of the similarity between (a) hallucinatory (or non-veridical) experience and (b) perception (or veridical experience). How does Smart try to resist this common argument for qualia? Is Smart's rejection of qualia defensible? Defend your answer with arguments or reasons.
4. Explain in detail the thesis we've called "the holism of the mental" and describe the problem for behaviorism posed by the truth of this thesis.

5. Explain and critique David Lewis's response to Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism or materialism.
6. Explain and critique our (handout 7b) objection to Jackson's inference from epistemic premises to a metaphysical conclusion—i.e. the inference from (a) the premise that upon leaving her black and white room Mary seems to realize something about what it has (all along) been like for us to see red, to (b) the conclusion there are non-physical (i.e. irreducibly mental) properties. (Our argument has the form of a dilemma.)
7. Explain and critique Lewis' argument that (a) acknowledging that Mary learns a new fact according to a broad scheme for individuating facts, entails (b) epiphenomenalism.
8. Explain Fodor's theory of belief and other propositional attitudes (i.e. the "language of thought" theory) and Carnap's theory of belief. Describe: (a) two desiderata for a theory of thought that Carnap's and Fodor's theories both meet, and (b) two problems for Carnap's theory that are not problems for Fodor's theory. Is Fodor's theory plausible? Why or why not?
8. According to Dretske and Fodor, an adequate theory of mental representation must solve the "disjunction problem." Explain the problem and Dretske's solution to it. Is Dretske's solution adequate? Defend your answer with arguments or reasons.