Phil 100D: Philosophy of Mind   Professor Aaron Zimmerman

<u>Final Exam</u>

Part 1: Answer 10 out of 15 of these questions. 2 points each.

1. Name two of the three theses that form the apparently "inconsistent triad" that Davidson tries to reconcile with his anomalous monism.
2. Define 'property dualism'.
3. According to Frege, what is the denotation of 'Samuel Clemens' when that name occurs in the following sentence: 'Mary hopes that Samuel Clemens comes home soon'.
4. Explain Frege's distinction between the sense and reference of an expression.
5. Explain the difference between a type and a token of that type using an example.
6. Explain the difference between the fine and broad individuation of a facts and describe sentences that are used to state the same broadly individuated fact but different finely individuated facts.
7. Suppose object o has property P. What does it mean to say that that P is one of o's **essential** properties?
8. Define "type-type identity theory" and provide two examples of plausible type identities.
9. Define "eliminativism" and explain the analysis of mental reports defended by "expressivist eliminativists."
10. Define 'functional property' and give an example of one.
11. Explain what it means to say that a kind of mental state is multiply realizable.
12. Define 'qualia'.
13. Explain the difference between correlating mental events with neurological events and identifying mental events with neurological events.
14. Explain Carnap's theory of belief.
15. Explain Dennett's distinction between the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. Give an example of the application of each stance.

Part II: *Answer 4 out of 5 of these essay questions. 20 points each.*

1. Block argues that functionalist theories of the mind are too liberal. Explain and critique Block's arguments. Can a functionalist effectively respond to Block's arguments without abandoning her commitment to the multiple realizability of mental states? Defend your answer with arguments or reasons.
2. Explain Davidson's anomalous monism and his claim that the "apparently inconsistent triad" he describes can be shown to be consistent if we embrace token identity theory along with a denial of type identities and psychophysical laws. Is anomalous monism as form of property dualism? Defend your answer with reasons or arguments.
3. Explain the "common road to qualia" taken by those who argue for qualia on the basis of the similarity between (a) hallucinatory (or non-veridical) experience and (b) perception (or veridical experience). How does Smart try to resist this common argument for qualia? Is Smart's rejection of qualia defensible? Defend your answer with arguments or reasons.
4. Explain and critique David Lewis's response to Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism or materialism.
5. Explain Fodor's theory of belief and other propositional attitudes (i.e. the "language of thought" theory) and Carnap's theory of belief. Describe: (a) two desiderata for a theory of thought that Carnap's and Fodor's theories both meet, and (b) two problems for Carnap's theory that are not problems for Fodor's theory. Is Fodor's theory plausible? Why or why not?