

**Moral Psych W 20**

Define the “objectivity” of a judgment, as Kumar and Stich define this concept with reference to the impossibility of faultless disagreement over its truth. Which, if any, of your moral judgments do you think of as objective in this sense? Must you judge that an action is objectively wrong in this sense to feel comfortable reprimanding or punishing people for breaking it? Must the state conceptualize an act as objectively wrong in this sense to justly imprison people for committing it?

Consider the case in which the person you are reprimanding or punishing does not share the moral principle you use to justify your condemnation of his behavior (e.g. reprimanding a socially conservative relative for educating his sons but not his daughters). Does your morality, in this sense, set limits to what you will tolerate in other people? Do you agree with Kumar that a norm or rule is only thought of as a distinctively “moral” rule if it is conceptualized as “objective” in this sense?

Do you draw a distinction between moral norms on the one hand and non-moral or extra-moral conventions of etiquette, councils of prudence, and norms of dress on the other? Describe Stich’s skepticism about the “naturalness” of the distinction between moral norms and non-moral conventions. Do you agree that this distinction is drawn differently by different people or different communities? Does that undermine your confidence in drawing the distinction as you now draw it? Must we make substantive moral assumptions to distinguish moral norms from mere conventions? If so, does this undercut the scientific status of the distinction? Why or why not?

**5-6 pages double-spaced, normal font and margins.**

**Assigned: 1/15/20**

**Due: 1/29/20**